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JUDICIAL' DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW ANI)PROCEDURE.
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER, ELMER A. WiLcox, JoHN
iLISLE.

CONSENT IN SoDofY.

The "National Economic League," with headquarters at 6 Beacon Street,
Boston, Mass., and a membership scattered over every state- and territory in the Union, by vote of sixty-five per cent of its membership, have declared that the issue of paramount consideration for 1913
is "Efficiency in the Administration of Justice;" i. e. the means whereby to
secure efficiency in the administration of justice in our courts. The laws are
all right, and there are plenty of good laws to secure the accomplishment of
almost every end desired, if they were but properly enforced. The trouble lies
with the administration of justice and not with the laws on the statute books.
Careless and dishonest officials do much to bring the administration of the law
into disrepute, and are a great source of thebreakdown and failure of justice
in this country. Incompetency on and off of the bench is another great source
of or cause of the failure of efficiency in the administration of justice-the enforcement of the law. The active machinations of the predatory interests and
the powers of darkness and vice and crime, is another source from which
springs the want of efficiency in the administration of justice-and particularly
so when the persons charged with the duty to see quiet and order preserved,
and the public officers charged with the enforcement of the laws deliberately
join in plans to defeat the operation of the laws, and deliberately join in frameups to "get" an honest and fearless public officer who knows "neither high nor
low, rich nor poor in preserving order and decency and in the enforcement of
the laws, as was the case in the recent notorious Guy Eddie case, in Los
Angeles, Cal.; a case reeking with mendacity and perjury on the part of law
officers and others charged with the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of peace and good order.
But it is not only in the petty offices that the proper and efficient enforcement of the laws break down. Not unfrequently the world is startled by a
pronounciamento from the bench of some supreme court of a state which sets
at defiance all the established rules of law and the dictates of common sense.
Such a case recently occurred in California, in which it is held, in effect, that
the revolting crime of sodomy is a sort of "gentleman's agreement" in those
cases where the pathic consents to the act, and that in such a case the principal
cannot be convicted on a charge of an assault to commit the crime against
nature where it appears that the subject consented to the act. (People vs. Dong
Pok Yip, California Supreme Court, Nov. 9, 1912, 127 Pac. Rep. 1031.)
If the doctrine of this case were good law, or had any support in the
principles of criminal jurisprudence, a degenerate, a low and vicious-minded
person of depraved nature or morals, could, merely by consenting to the actthat is, by becoming a particeps criminlis or an accomplice-deprive of its
criminality the most beastly of crimes known to modern times, and send out
unwhipped of justice the miscreant who perpetrated it; in other words, such a
person, by his mere consent, could override and nullify the will of the legislature and set the laws of the state at defiance.
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In the above California case the alleged victim of the assault was a boy
nine years of age. The only evidence given with reference to the episode which
culminated in the defendant's arrest was furnished by one Rodrigues, bookkeeper for a certain transportation company at Antioch, and by the boy who
was called as a witness by the defendant. Mr. Rodrigues testified that from
his office on the wharf he saw the boy and the Chinaman, Dong Pok Yip. The
former had been fishing, and the latter had been playing with another lad; but
after a time the witness observed them seated together and the Chinaman was
teaching the boy how to fish. Subsequently he noticed the boy fishing while
the defendant, who had his arm around the child, was whispering to him. This
attracted the particular attention of Mr. Rodrigues, who watched the two from
the door of his office. As he was thus observing them, the Chinaman arose,
helped the boy to his feet, and they walked hand in hand along the wharf; but
as they passed the office they were not holding hands. The boy seemed to the
witness to be going willingly, and the latter observed no coercion of any sort
on the part of the Chinaman. A few minutes later the witness followed in the
direction taken by the boy and the defendant. He found them near an oil tank
in some brush, which was about a foot in height in the direction from which
he was looking, but high enough to screen them from any one who might look
from the opposite side. They were both stooping; the boy, who faced Rodrigues, was in front of the defendant with his back to the latter, and defendant
had his hands on the sides of the boy's waist. Rodrigues did not see the lad's
person, but he did observe that the back of the boy's overalls hung down and
that the Chinaman's trousers were unbuttoned in front. When they saw
Rodrigues they quickly changed their positions; the boy slipping one of the
suspenders of his "bib overalls" over his shoulder, and the Chinaman fastening
the top button of his trousers.
In commenting on the evidence the court says: "If it could be fairly said
that the evidence in the present case compelled the conclusion that the boy
knowingly consented to the commission of the crime charged against the defendant, there would be no escape from a reversal of the judgment" of conviction of simple assault.
And further on in the opinion we find this language:
"In the case at bar the jury was properly instructed by the trial court that,
if the boy consented to the assault complained of, the defendant should be found
not guilty. Presumably the jury, in its deliberations, heeded this instruction,
but upon weighing the evidence concluded, justly, we think, that the boy
victim of the assault merely submitted to the act attempted by the defendant
without knowing the nature of the act or realizing the design of the defendant.
These views are, in our opinion, correct and are hereby adopted by this court."
This is a very novel doctrine, to say the least. The court cites no authority
in support of its conclusion, and this opinion- is thought to stand alone in
announcing this doctrine.
The well-established rule of the criminal law is (See Kerr's Wharton on
Cr. L. §762) that the consent of the catamite or pathic does not in any way
affect the criminality of the act or.attempted act; it simply makes the consenting party an accomplice in the act, and his testimony as to the act must be
corroborated to be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the actor, under the
rules of evidence. (Commonzwealth vs. Poindexter, 133 Ky. 720, 11 S. W. 943;
State vs. Wilkins, 221 Mo. 414, 120 S. W. 22. See Commonwealth vs. Snow,
'1 Mass. 411; Commonwealth vs. Smith, 14 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 114; Jordan vs.
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State (Tex. Cr. App.), 137 S. W. 114; Deary vs. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 137
S. W. 699.) Such consent cannot be interposed as a defense, because the crime
is against society and the state, and not primarily against the victim. Commonwealth vs. Smith, 14 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 362; Reg vs. Jellyntan, 8 Car. & P. 604,
34 Eng. C. L.; Reg. vs. Allen, 2 Car. & K. 869, 61 Eng. C. L., 3 Cox. C. C. 270,
1 Den. C. C. 364, Temple M. 55, 18 L. J. Mag. Cas. (N. S.) 72, 13 Jur. 108. In
simple assault it is different, and the same rules of law do not apply, because
there the injury is to the feelings of the victim, primarily, and not an offense
against society or the state.
The court, in the California case, has hopelessly confused the rules of law
applicable to the two classes of offenses or crimes, and the result is a doctrine
unsound in principle, and one which will not meet the approval of the California
supreme court on more mature deliberation.
It is submitted that, on principle, the boy involved in the California case
cannot, as a matter of law, be considered as consenting, both by reason of his
tender years and his defective mentality. (Reg. vs. Lock, L. R. 2 C. C. 10, 12
Cox C. C. 244. See also Kerr's Wharton. on Cr. L. §699, §750 and authorities
there cited.) The California supreme court says:
"While the little fellow was evidently not a child of even ordinary intelligence, the learned judge of the superior court, who presided at the trial, after
a very careful examination permitted him to be sworn as a witness."
Recognizing. this fact it was the duty of the California court to dismiss,
of its own motion, the consideration of the question of consent injected into
the case wrongfully by the attorneys for the defendant, because, as a matter
of law, it was manifest there could be no delictum on the boy's part because
of (1) his tender years, and (2) his defective mentality, which was so low
that the trial court was in serious" doubt whether he was of sufficient intellect
to be admissible as a witness in case. (See Mascolo vs. Montesanto, 61 Conn.
50, 29 Am. St. Rep. 170, 23 At. Rep. 714.
[Since the foregoing comment'was received, its author has communicated
the following material which was brought together for another purpose, and
which goes more fully into the matter-EDs.]
Conisent as a defeise.-In a prosecution on a charge of an attempt to
commit the infamous crime against nature, the jury are properly instructed that
if the boy, the subject of the assault, consented thereto, the defendant should
be found not guilty * * * People vs. Dong Pok Yip (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9,
1912), 127 Pac. Rep. 1031.
This holding of the court is in harmony with the prior holding by the
same court in the case of People vs. Hickey, 109 Cal. 275,277, 41 Pac. 1027,
which decision cites no authorities to justify the holding of the court, and is
out of harmony with all other cases, and is thought to be wrong on fundamental principle.
Consent of the catamite, pathic or subject in no case can, on any wellrecognized principle of the law, by any possibility be or constitute a valid defense to a prosecution on a charge of sodomy, or of an attempt to commit
sodomy in any of its branches. The fact of the consent of the subject to the
commission, or to the attempt to commit the crime of sodomy can in no wise
affect the criminal nature of the act prohibited, or prevent it from being a
crime under a statute in which the element of consent is not found. (See
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authorities I Kerr's Whart. Cr. L. §762). Otherwise a degenerate or a person
of low and depraved mind or character could, by a consent to the beastly act,
nullify the act of the legislature.
Two kinds of crimes and offenses exist: (1) Those which affect the individual only, and (2) those which affect the public at large; that is (a) the welfare of the people as a whole, -or (b) the morals of the people or the perpetuity of the race. Both these are the proper concern of the government.
Sodomy is properly classed as (2) (b), and is one of the class of crimes which
an injured party is without power to condone, compromise, or to accept compensation for-and thus wipe out the criminal .character of the act and relieve
the accused of all liability to punishment under the law, made for the good of
the whole people.
Same-Rules of law applicable to and governing in the first class of crimes
named above, are not applicable in the prosecution for crimes affecting the
public at large or the public welfare, and to apply them in the trial and determination of this class of criminal cases is error. The application of the rule.
of law governing in a case of simple assault (which affects the individual only)
to a charge of an assault to commit sodomy (which affects the public at large
as -being injurious to the general welfare),, is manifestly fundamental error.
Presumption of innocense rule requiring every one charged with the commission of crime be regarded as innocent until his guilt is clearly proved, undoubtedly applies to such a case; but, had the crime charged against Dong Pok
Yip been buggery instead of plain sodomy, the court surely would not have
been justified in invoking the further presumption of the "consent" of the
beast, and on that ground discharged the accused; but this would not have
been more fundamentally violative of the principles applicable to the case.
Consent no defense to a prosecution on a charge of sodomy or of an attempt to commit sodomy, is the doctrine of all the cases outside of California.
See Marcalo vs. Montesanto, 61 Conn. 50, 29 Am. St. Rep. 170, 23 Atl. 714;
Territory vs. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 112; Means vs. State, 125 Wis. 650, 104 N. W.
815; R. vs. Allen, 2 Car. & K. 869, 3 Cox. C. C. 270, 1 Den. C. C. 364, 13 Jur.
180, 18 L. J. M. C. 72, T. & M. 55, 61 Eng. C. L. 869; R. vs. Jellyman, 8 Car. &
P. 604, 34 Eng. C. L. 547. See also I Kerr's Whart. Cr. L. §762.
Consent does not in any way take away the criminal character of the act of
the accused, or relieve him from liability to punishment for the act; it affects
the person consenting only, and has the effect (1) to make him a principal in
the crime, and liable to punishment as such (R. vs. Allen, 2 Car. & K. 869, 3
Cox. C. C. 270, 1 Den. C. C. 364, 13 Jur. 108, 18 L. J. M. C. 72, T. & M. 55, 61
Eng. C L. 869; 1 Hale P. C. 669), and (2) to make him an accomplice, and
require corroboration of his testimony before a conviction can be secured. See
Cont. vs. Snow, 111 Mass. 411; Territory vs. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 112; People vs.
Deschessere, 69 App. Dec. (N. Y.) 217, 74 N. Y. Supp. 761; Medis vs. State,
27 Tex. App. 194, 11 Am. St. Rep. 192, 11 S. W. 112; R. vs. Jellyinan, 8 Car. &
P. 604, 34 Eng. C. L. 547. See also 2 Bishop's Cr. L. 1018; 1 Kerr's Whart. Cr.
L. §761.
Same-In Illinois the rule is otherwise, and conviction may be had upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the consenting subject. Honselman vs. People,
168 Ill. 172, 48 N. E. 304; Kelly vs. People, 192 Ill. 119, 85 Am. St. Rep. 323,
61 N. E. 425.
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Inability of child of tender years to consent to the crime of sodomy, is
universally recognized--outside of the two -California cases above cited. In
the principal case above the child was but nine years of age, and the court says,
"the little fellow was evidently not a child of ordinary intelligence." This
being so it was the duty of the court to disregard the plea of the consent of the
child, because he was, by reason of his tender.years and his inferior grade of
intelligence, incapable of consenting, under the well-established rules of law
applicable to the case.
Same-Boy of seven years of age cannot consent to -an act of sodomy.
Means vs. State, 125 Wis. 650, 104 N. W. 815; R. vs. Lock, 12 Cox C. C. 244,
2 C. C. 10, 42 N. J. M. C. 5, 27 L T. R. (N. S.) 661, 21 W. R. 144.
Sane-Boy of twelve years of age is held to be incapable of consenting to
such an act, although he submits without resistance. Marcolo vs. Montesanto,
61 Conn. 50, 29 Am. St. Rep. 170, 23 Atl. 714.
And where the evidence showed that the defendant, charged with buggery,
was but ten or twelve years old, conviction was set aside, because of his incapacity to commit the crime charged. Williams vs. Co. (Va.) 22 S. E. 859.
HENRY M. HANSON, of the Dayton, Ohio, Bar.
The decision criticised above by Mr. Hanson is noticed by Mr. James M.
Kerr in Cal. Cumulative Digest for April, Vol. II, No. 2, as follows: The above
case and the case of People v. Hickey, 109 Cal. 275, 277, 41 Pac. 1027 (not cited
in the principal case), stand alone in so holding. Consent of the.catamite, pathic
or subject can in no case, by any possibility, be or constitute a valid defense, or
any defense, to a charge of the crime of sodomy, in any of its branches, or to a
charge of an attempt to commit that crime; but such consent has the effect-and
this is absolutely its only effect-to make the pathic or subject an accomplice
with the actor, and his testimony is required to be corroborated. To hold otherwise is to ignore and disregard the well-established and fundamental distinction between the rules of law governing in the trial of crimes which affect the
individual injured and crimes which affect the general public welfare. The fact
of consent by the pathic or subject of the prohibited crime can in no wise affect
the nature of the prohibited act, or prevent the act or the atteinpt to commit the
act from being a crime under a statute in which the element of consent is not
found. Otherwise a degenerate or viciously lewd person of low and depraved
mind and instincts and perverted moral character could, by consenting, nullify
the act of the legislature-a proposition that is unthinkable. See authorities
and discussion in Kerr's "Consolidated Supplement" to the California Cyclopedic
Codes (now in press), Penal Code part, section 286; and Kerr's Wharton on
Criminal Law, vol. 1, section 762.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
People v. Kennedy, 138 N. Y. Supp. 581. Referendum provision. The referendum provision of Bronz County Act (Laws 1912, c. 548, approved April 19,
1912, sec. 15), to the effect that it should be inoperative unless at the general election in November, 1912, a majority of the votes cast should be in its favor, was
not unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, since on approval the
power of the Legislature was exercised, and on an affirmative vote the act would
be effective, not by virtue of the popular vote, but by virtue of its enactment by
the Legislature.
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Rosenthal v. The People of the State of N. Y. U. S. Supreme Court, Oct.
Term, 1912. Police regulation of junk dealers. No unconstitutional interference
with the liberty of contract is made by the provisions of the N. Y. laws, 1903,
chap. 326, amending Pen. Code, section 550, which, as construed by the highest
court of the state, made it a criminal offense for a dealer in or a collector of
junk, metals, or second-hand materials, to buy or receive any stolen wire, cable,
copper, lead, solder, iron or brass used by or belonging to .a railroad, telephone,
telegraph, gas, or electric light company, without making diligent inquiry whether
the person selling or delivering it has a legal right to do so, but such legislation
is well within the legitimate bounds of the police power of the state.
EMBEZZLEMENT.

State v. Strasser. N. J. 85 Atl. 227. An attorney at law agreed to prepare
and file a certificate extending the corporate existence of a company at a total
expense to the company of $75 including filing fees. The company's check for $30
was paid to the attorney for the state filing fee, deposited by him, and his own
check for $30 which he sent to the Secretary of State, was protested. The company obtained its certificate by the payment to the Secretary of State of $30.
Upon his trial for the fraudulent conversion of the $30 that had been paid to him,
the defendant offered evidence to show that the company had not paid him the
$75 it had agreed to pay for its certificate. Held, that the exclusion of this evidence was error, as it was competent and material upon the question whether any
fraudulent conversion of the company's money had resulted or could have resulted
unless the company paid more for its certificate than it had agreed to pay, and
hence was relevant upon the question of a fraudulent intent.
State v. Grills, R. I. 85 Atl. 281. A depositor in a bank directed the banker
to set aside $600 of the deposit for transmission by the banker to a bank in a foreign country. The banker entered in the pass book the withdrawal of $600 from
the deposit, and made an entry of the amount of the balance, and gave the depositor a receipt for $600 for transmission to a foreign bank. He did not transmit
the money nor give*any reason for his failure to do so. Held, that the general
deposit was converted into a-special deposit to the amount of $600, and became a
fund in the hands of the banker, and he was guilty of embezzlement when he
fraudulently converted the same to his own use.
Commonwealth v. Stone, 236 Pa., p. 35. An indictment against private bankers under the Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 196, cannot be sustained where the indictment shows on its face that the money which the prosecutrix claims had been
embezzled had been deposited to her credit in a banking institution of which defendants were members. Monies deposited in the bank ceased to be the property
of the depositor and became the property of the bank.
EVIDENCE.

Egter v. State, Dela. 85 AtI. 731. Evidence of other offenses. -Defendant
was prosecuted for conspiracy to steal, in that he induced the prosecuting witness
to purchase a dry goods business, witness to put in $3,600 cash, defendant and
one of his associates $5,000 each in cash, and that, while the defendant was counting his money, men claiming to be detectives broke in, stated that it was counterfeit, took the money of the witness, mixed it with that of the defendant, and disappeared. The court admitted, to show defendanes intent and design, testimony
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of a witness that three months afterward he had been robbed of money in the
same way by defendant, and those whom the evidence tended to identify as the
same associates. Held, that, as the testimony of the other offense had no direct
connection with the offense charged, its admission was reversible error.
GRAND JURY.

People v. McCauley, Ill. 100 N. E. 182. Cr. Code, div. 11, section 3 (Hurd's
Rev. St. 1911, c. 38, section 405), providing that the grand jurors, being dismissed
before court adjourns, may be summoned again on any "special occasion" at such
time as the court directs, does not limit the power of the grand jury, when recalled, to a consideration of matters within the special purpose for which they
are recalled; but they may investigate and return indictments on any matter submitted to them.
Even if grand jurors were limited by Cr. Code, div. 11, section 3 (Hurd's
Rev. St. 1911, c. 38, section 405) to a consideration of the special matters for
which they were reassembled, it would not be presumed, in the absence of any
showing to the contrary, that the matter for which they indicted the defendant
was not among such matters.
A grand jury being reassembled by the court under Cr. Code, div. 11, sec. 3
(Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 38, section 405), even if for consideration of business
for which the court. bad no power to recall it, was a de facto grand jury, whose
acts cannot be set aside by writ of error, in the absence of a motion to quash the
indictment or a challenge to the array in the trial court.
A grand jury recalled under Cr. Code, div. 11, section. 3 (Hurd's Rev. St.
1911, c. 38, section 405), after being dismissed; to discharge some additional duties
during the same' term at which it had been impaneled and sworn need not be
resworn; the oath prescribed by Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 78, section 18, "to diligently inquire into the true presentment make of all such matters and things as
shall be given you in charge, or shall otherwise come to your knowledge, touching the present service," being broad enough to cover all service such jury may
render during the term--"present service" meaning all the services that may be
lawfully required of such jury during its existence as an organized body.
HOMICIDE.

People v. Spohr, N. Y. 100 N. E. 444. Murder in the first degree. Where
accused, upon finding another man in the company of a girl to whom he had paid
attentions, wounded the man and upon his escape killed the girl accidentally, the
assault upon the man, though with a deadly weapon, will not render accused
guilty of murder in the first degree for Penal Law (Consol. Laws, 1909, c. 40),
section 1044, subd. 1, defines "murder in the first degree," as the killing of a
human being with a deliberate and premeditated design to effect death, while
"murder in the second degree" is defined by section 1046 as a killing when committed with a design to effect death but without deliberation or premeditation,
and section 240 defines "assault in the first degree" as the act of a person who,
with intent to kill a human being, assaults another with a loaded firearm.
LARCENY.

Commonwealth v. Cline, Mass., 100 N. E. 358.

Attempt fo commit larceny

fron the person. An indictment for an attempt to commit larceny from the per-
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son of one unknown to the jurors may be established by proof of a general intent to commit larceny and the doing of overt acts toward its accomplishment,
and without showing the amount which might have been stolen, so that it is not
necessary to describe the property or allege its value, or even that the person
unknown had anything on his person, which could have been the subject of larceny.
MANSLAUGHTER.

Welty v. State, Ind., 100 N. E. 73. Provocation and cooling time. An instruction, on trial for homicide, that to constitute manslaughter the provocation
must have been such that the accused was not the master of his understanding,
and that, if sufficient time had elapsed for reason to resume its sway, the offense
was not mitigated to manslaughter, was not erroneous, on the theory that, if the
accused's temperament was such that he was still controlled by passion, the offense would be manslaughter only, since while the jury may consider the physical organization and state of mind of the accused and the question of cooling
time, the court cannot fix a rule of law as applying to different temperaments.
Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343. Voluntary manslaughter is a homicide intentionally committed under the influence of passion. The term "passion"
as here used includes both anger and terror provided they reach a degree of intensity sufficient to obscure temporarily the reason of the person affected. Terror
from the belief on the part of the slayer that his life is in danger is sufficient
though such belief is not reasonable.
The border line between self defense and this character of manslaughter
seems to be the existence as a moving course of a reasonably found belief of
imminent peril to life or great bodily harm as distinguished from the influence of
an uncontrollable fear or terror conceivable as existing but not reasonably justified by the existing circumstances. If the circumstances are both adequate to
raise and sufficient to justify a belief in the necessity to take life in order to
save one's self from such a danger where the belief exists and is acted upon the
homicide is excusable upon the theory of self-defense; while, if the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily
harm caused by the circumstances but without the presence of all the ingredients
necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self defense, the killing is manslaughter.
Commonwealth v. Brent, 233 Pa., 381. On the trial of an indictment for
murder where drunkenness is set up as a defense and a number of witnesses are
produced by the defendant in support of such defense, a verdict of guilty of
murder of the first degree will not be reversed where nearly a dozen witnesses
for the Commonwealth testified that he was not drunk and the trial judge carefully defines the difference between murder in the first degree and murder in the
second degree and otherwise properly and adequately instructs the jury.
The Judge had charged: "The Commonwealth must satisfy your minds beyond a reasonable doubt of every material element of the charge against the defendant but when the defendant sets up as a defense that he was intoxicated to
a degree that he was incapable of forming a wilful, deliberate and premeditated
intent to take a life the burden rests on the defendant to satisfy you of such
degree of intoxication not beyond a reasonable doubt but by a predominance of
the others.'
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Commonwealth v. De Masi, 234 Pa., 570. Murder. Testimony of an accom.
plice. There is no rule of law in Pennsylvania that forbids a conviction of murder on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
MONOPOLIES.

U. S. v. Patten, 33 Sup. Ct. Repr. 141. Corner in Cotton. A conspiracy to
run a corner in the available supply of a staple commodity, such as cotton, normally a subject of interstate trade and commerce, to be accomplished by purchases for future delivery, coupled with a withholding from sale for a limited
time, thereby enhancing artificially its price to buyers throughout the country,
is within the terms of the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, section 1, which makes
it a criminal offense to engage in a conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce, since by its necessary operation it will directly and materially impede and
burden such commerce:
A conspiracy to corner the market in a commodity, though it may tend to
stimulate competition for a time, is within the provisions of the anti-trust act of
July 2, 1890, making it a criminal offense to engage in a conspiracy in restraint
of interstate commerce, if it also operates to thwart the usual operation of the
laws of supply and demand, to withdraw the commodity from the normal current of trade, to enhance the price artificially, to hamper users and consumers
in satisfying their needs, and to produce practically the same evils as does the
suppression of competition.
PUNISHMENT.
People v. Beckqr, 138 N. Y. Supp. 771, Indeterminate Sentence. Penal Law
(Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) sec. 2189, provides that a person never before convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the states prison, who is
convicted of a felony other than murder in the first or second degree and sentenced to the states prison, shall be given an indeterminate sentence. Held, that
under section 21, providing that the provisions of the law shall be construed
according to their fair import, section 2189 did not apply only to those persons
who had been previously convicted of a felony in New York; and hence where
accued, on being convicted of a felony, was shown to have been previously convicted in Ohio of two crimes for which he would have been punishable by imprisonment in the states prison in New York, had they been committed there,
he was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence under section 2189.
People v. Carlesi, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309. Second offense after first offense pardoned. Under Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 40) sec: 1941 which provides that
a person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony, or under
the laws under any other government of a crime, which, if committed in this state,
would be a felony, commits any crime, is punishable upon conviction as for a
second offense, a prior conviction of a felony under the federal statute, after
pardon and restoration to civil rights, may be the basis of a conviction of a subquent crime as a second .offense; since the punishment inflicted is solely for
the second offense to which a greater degree of criminality is thereby attached.
RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

People v. O'Reilly, 138 N. Y. Supp. 776.- Elements of the offense. Where a
lawyer, while representing thieves in obtaining a reward for the return of stolen
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property, receives the property, knowing it to have been stolen, and keeps it until
the reward is paid, and then delivers it over' to the representative of the owner,
he is guilty as principal, within Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) sec. 1308,
of receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, or withholding it for
reward, and it is immaterial that for his own protection he has induced the
owner's representative to nominally retain him to assist in recovering the
property.
REviEw.

State v. Merkle, N. J., 85 Atl. 330. Harmless error. An indictment, charging the soliciting of a bribe to vote for one Hannis, omitted to state that it was
Hannis who was solicited, which was made the ground of a motion to quash,
which was denied. The motion disclosed that the fact that it was Hannis' name
that was omitted was known to the defendant, who was in no wise prejudiced
at the trial by such omission. Held that the denial of a motion to quash being
a matter of discretion, was not reviewable upon error assigned on a bill of exceptions.
SENTENCE.

State v. Slurgis, Me., 85 Atl. 474. Alternative sentence. A sentence in a
criminal case must be definite and certain, and not dependant upon any contingency or condition, and, in the absence of a statute, a sentence in the alternative is bad for uncertainty.
Rev. St. C, 136, section 5, which provides that, when a convict is sentenced
to jail, the court may, in addition, sentence him to the other punishment provided by law for the same offense, with the condition that if he cannot be received at the jail to which sentenced, or if at any time before the expiration of
the sentences he becomes incorrigible or unsafe, the inspector of jails may order
that he suffer such alternate sentence, is special and limited in its operation, its
very enactment emphasizing the fact that alternative sentences without statutory
authority are void, and does not authorize alternative sentences generally.
SPECIFIC INTENT.

State v. Gallagher, N. J., 85 Atl. 207. The offense charged by the allegation
in an indictment that the defendant committed an assault upon E, with intent
to kill the said E may be sustained by proving that the assault was made upon E
with intent to kill G.
The general principle of the criminal law that the intent with which an act
is done determines the legal character of its consequences, although such consequences operate upon a different person from that intended applies to statutory
as well as to common law crimes.
Upon the trial of the accused for committing an assault upon E with intent
to kill E, proof that his intention was to kill G, is relevant, and not evidence of a
distinct offense.

